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Summary 
The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) is a landmark environmental 
policy, representing the world’s first large-scale greenhouse gas (GHG) trading 
program.  The coexistence of state actors and top-down processes with stakeholders 
participation and flexible abatement strategies make the EU ETS a powerful instrument 
of cross sectoral integration of environmental concerns, which benefits from a high 
level of interaction among the actors involved and a significant degree of information 
exchange.  However, the same peculiarities of the system make it difficult to identify a 
correspondence with a single mode of governance. The EU ETS shows characteristics 
of the decision making processes and institutions engaged, the tools and instruments 
used as well as the actors involved, which change according to the different levels of 
governance, and belong both to the old and to the new modes of governance. The 
emission trading scheme represents a clear example of Multi-Level governance, where 
the different modes of governance interact among them and affect each other. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
On January 1, 2005, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
was officially launched, only two years after the European Council adopted the 
EU Emission Trading Directive (European Community 2003). As a consequence 
of this formal start, the world’s largest ever market in emissions has been 
established, and European companies across several sectors and industries now 
face a carbon-constrained reality in form of legally binding emission targets and a 
price that has to be paid for carbon dioxide (CO2). Within essentially one year, 
2004, the international carbon market has gained momentum through major 
policy developments and quick market responses, which among others have 
enabled the establishment of a framework for the EU carbon market. 
The EU ETS is by far the largest cap-and-trade system in the world. It covers 
approximately 11,500 sources and the pre-policy emissions covered total to 
approximately 2.2 billion tons of CO2, corresponding to almost half of the CO2 
emissions originating from the EU. The market covers six key industrial sectors, 
notably electricity and heat production plants greater than 20MW capacity, oil 
refineries, coke ovens, metal ore and steel installations, cement kilns, glass 
manufacturing, ceramics manufacturing, and paper, pulp and board mills. The 
Commission is willing to include other sectors and gases in the post-2012 period. 
For instance, there is now growing agreement over the need to include aviation in 
the next trading period (European Commission, 2006b). 
This paper analyses the instrument of emissions trading as a possibility to bridge 
the gap between environmental concerns and barriers against a broad and 
successful implementation of environmental policy in Europe. 
In particular, we want to verify whether the EU Emission Trading Scheme has 
been able to integrate climate change concerns into the strategies of a wide array 
of stakeholders and industries. To provide a focussed analysis we firstly 
introduce the concept of environmental policy integration (EPI) in Section 2. We 
then discuss the EU ETS under the following three dimensions of governance 
and environmental policy integration: decision making processes and institutions 
engaged (Section 3), tools and instruments used (Section 4), and actors involved 
(Section 5). The dynamic processes that underpinned the development of EU 
ETS – in particular with reference to the negotiations among different actors and 
institutions – are presented in Section 6. After identifying the main instruments 
applied throughout the different phases of definition and implementation of the  
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Emission Trading system, we relate the scheme to the more widely known modes 
of governance. In particular, Section 7 analyses the possible relevance of a 
system of multi-level governance considering the dominant modes of governance 
for each level and the interactions among them. Finally, in Section 8 we draw first 
lessons from the EU ETS as a tool to foster environmental policy integration on 
sectors’ strategies and plans, and provide some conclusions for governance and 
environmental policy integration in general. 
2. THE EPI CONCEPT  
The EU ETS began operation on January 1, 2005. Even though the scheme 
faced a number of difficulties in its beginning – as will be discussed in more detail 
in this and the following sections – it turned out to be an effective tool to limit 
Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) emissions: the quantitative limit on CO2 emissions 
became binding immediately on that date and a real or opportunity cost was 
imposed on the emissions of virtually all stationary industrial and electricity 
generating sources within the European Union. Within less than five years, the 
EU ETS evolved from being an innovative but controversial idea to an 
indispensable instrument of European climate change policy. The following quote 
from an observer at Point Carbon, one of the leading data providers and 
commentators on the EU ETS was typical of early opinion. 
“We believe that the chances of having a Community-wide 
trading scheme in place by 2005 is a low-probability scenario.” 
(Point Carbon, September 2001) 
This judgment by an insider indicates the difficulties related to the implementation 
of the EU ETS and makes the achievement even more impressive. The key steps 
in the process were the development of the Emission Trading (ET) Directive, the 
addition of the Linking Directive, and the unique EU process of transposition and 
implementation. 
The main purpose of the European ET Directive 2003/87 was to establish a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading. The system could 
facilitate compliance to the Kyoto Protocol  for the European Annex B parties, by 
establishing a market to address emission reduction requirements in a few 
specified sectors (energy activities, production and processing of metal ore, iron 
and steel, cement, glass and ceramic production, production of pulp, paper and 
board) referred to as “trading sectors”. According to the Burden Sharing  
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Agreement of the Kyoto Protocol, each country was given a reduction target to 
comply with by 2012: the EU ETS established a first warm up phase from 2005 to 
2007 and a “compliance phase” from 2008 to 2012 which coincides with the 
Kyoto Protocol compliance period. The warm up phase of the EU ETS was meant 
to put Member States on the path to compliance by starting to address the issue 
of emission reduction early enough to avoid dramatic cuts in the 2008-2012 
period, and at the same time gain experience with the new compliance 
instrument.  The EU ETS is a mandatory scheme, which means that all Member 
States must be a party to it: for new countries, participation in the scheme is a 
precondition for becoming a party to the European Union itself. 
Emission trading allows for the lowest cost reductions, letting countries/ 
installations with high abatement costs buy permits on the market from 
countries/installations whose abatement costs are much lower.  Emission permits 
in the EU ETS are issued and exchanged in the market among countries, each 
permit allowing for the emission of 1 tonne of CO2 equivalent. Allowances in the 
EU scheme are not printed but held in electronic accounts in registries in each 
Member State, who is responsible for the transcription of all transfers, 
cancellations, and surrenders of the permits. In order to link up to the registries 
system, each Member State must establish a national registry in the form of a 
standardised electronic database as well as a communication link. A Community 
Independent Transaction log keeps track of all movements of permits and serves 
as verification for irregularities. 
The first step in creating a market for carbon permits is to establish a volume 
level: through National Allocation Plans (NAPs), subject to the European 
Commission’s approval, each Member State has to propose a total number of 
allowances and the way it plans to allocate them to national installations 
belonging to the trading sectors for each trading phase, of which 95% during the 
warm up phase and 90% during every subsequent period must be allocated for 
free. The allocation plan must respect a list of criteria provided by the European 
Commission
1; in particular it has to be coherent with the emission reduction 
target each country must comply with. The administration of the Emission Trading 
Directive is subject to subsidiarity, which means that each Member State can 
implement a different plan, for instance allocating the shortage to different 
sectors, according to their abatement potential, relevance and maturity. 
                                                           
1 For further details see Annex III, Directive 2003/87/EC.  
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The characteristics and the results discussed above clearly show the potential of 
the system to integrate environmental concerns, regarding in this case 
compliance to the Kyoto Protocol and CO2 emissions reduction, into sectoral 
policies. The choice of a market instrument, instead of a command and control 
policy, was taken with the purpose to internalize the negative externality through 
the most economically efficient solution. Even though compliance with the EU 
ETS is mandatory for the identified sectors, the costs of compliance for individual 
sources are minimised as compared to other instruments of control. The key 
advantage of emissions trading is that firms can flexibly choose to meet their 
targets, rather than use predetermined technologies or standards. Emissions 
sources with low-cost reduction opportunities can over comply and sell their 
additional allowances to sources where reductions would be more difficult and 
costly. This leads to the lowest overall cost. Emission trading is particularly 
relevant to climate change mitigation as carbon dioxide and other GHGs have the 
same effect wherever they are emitted, but compliance costs differ dramatically 
across sources. Hence there is considerable scope for trading, and opportunity 
for considerable gains from these trades.  
Many strategic and implementation issues have been solved through an intense 
debate and a profitable interaction between the Commission, the Member States 
and the stakeholders, improving the degree of information availability and the 
capacity of  using the results of early actions and consultative processes for 
policy making process. 
3. DECISION MAKING PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS  
3.1.  The Emission Trading Directive  
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes an International Emissions Trading, 
and represents the foundation of the European Emission Trading Directive. 
Indeed, following the signature of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union found 
itself in the need for a new comprehensive strategy to meet its Protocol 
commitments. After having demonstrated its positive position towards market-
based instruments already in the 5th EC Environmental Action Programme 
(European Community 1993), where an introduction of these instruments in 
environmental policy was suggested, the Commission explicitly recognized in 
1998 the possibility to set up a European trading regime by 2005 (European 
Commission 1998).  
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The real milestone for emissions trading in Europe occurred in March 2000 with 
the release of the Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the 
European Union (European Commission 2000). In this document, the 
Commission proposed emission trading as an instrument that enables cost-
effective implementation of the overall target and provides incentives to invest in 
environmentally sound technologies. The Green Paper was intended to illustrate 
the key points and functioning of emission trading and to launch the debate within 
European institutions and stakeholders on the suitability of such a scheme and 
the way it might operate, emphasizing that such an instrument should start by 
2005 in order to allow the European Community and its Member States to gain 
experience in its implementation before the international emission trading 
scheme starts in 2008.  
The Green Paper was the first important and direct input to the establishment of a 
European market for CO2, and the Commission released it simultaneously with a 
communication on the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP). The 
ECCP was consequently launched in June 2000, initially focused on the 
development of further policies and measures in the energy, transport and 
industry sectors. A number of working groups were set up to consider and give 
recommendations on the most important options for reducing GHG emissions 
cost-effectively, amongst them Working Group I on flexible mechanisms. Based 
on the findings of all working groups, the Commission published in June 2001 an 
ECCP Report on the potential initiatives for reducing GHG emissions. Following 
on from this report, in October 2001, the Commission brought forward a package 
of broad measures to tackle climate change. One of the measures proposed was 
a framework Directive on GHG emissions trading within the European 
Community to enable certain businesses and industries to trade their allocations 
for CO2 emissions (EC 2001). The draft proposal expected the trading system to 
start in 2005 and was the result of a long series of informal consultations at the 
European level. 
Still, several issues related to the proposal were unclear, and the opposition from 
different parts of the European Commission as well as other European 
Institutions was strong. As a consequence, the final text of the Emission Trading 
Directive evolved alongside numerous discussions and additional information. 
This process was initiated by the release of a non-paper on synergies between 
the proposal and the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive 




2, both aimed at clarifying some misunderstanding 
surrounding the draft proposal. 
In October 2002, the first reading of the proposal took place in the European 
Parliament, and several amendments on the allocation method, opting in, linking 
to Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) of the 
Kyoto Protocol, and sanctions for not compliance were suggested. Following the 
opinion of the European Parliament, as well as the opinion of the Committee of 
Regions and the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, the Commission 
presented in November 2002 an amended proposal for a GHG trading directive 
(EC 2002), in which suggested amendments concerning – amongst others – the 
method and extent of penalties and transparency were accepted. 
As a next step, the Council adopted its Common Position on the directive in 
March 2003
3, proposing several amendments to the Parliament’s document on 
the allocation method, opting out, opting in, pooling, linking to JI/CDM, and 
sanctions. In a communication to the European Parliament, the Commission 
welcomed the adoption of the common position as it incorporated many of the 
amendments proposed by the European Parliament. The Commission – who had 
initially opposed the possibility of auctioning in the first trading phase as 
requested by the Parliament – also acknowledged that the common position’s 
requirement for Member States during the period 2008-2012 to allocate at least 
90% of allowances free of charge gives businesses and Member States greater 
certainty of what to expect in the future.  
Based on the European Parliament’s amendments to the Council’s common 
position adopted at the sitting of 2 July 2003, the Council and the European 
Parliament, in the framework of the co-decision procedure, reached agreement in 
second reading of the directive. This Council-Parliament agreement gave the 
green light to the final text of the forthcoming directive, followed by the opinion of 
the Commission on the European Parliament's amendments (European 
Community 2003) – where the Commission accepted among others the 
possibility of auctioning as well as the extension of other greenhouse gases and 
other installations by Member States from 2008 – and the final adoption by the 
Council at its meeting of 22 July 2003. The final text of Directive 2003/87/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
                                                           
2 Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/emissions_faq.pdf  




scheme for GHG emission allowance trading within the Community (European 
Commission 2003) was thus the result of a long and difficult negotiation among 
European institutions. 
3.2.  The Linking Directive 
In parallel to the evolution of the Emission Trading Directive, the Commission 
considered the necessity to adopt a specific provision linking JI and CDM credits 
to the European trading scheme in order to further exploit the cost-effectiveness 
of flexible mechanisms. On 23 July 2003, following the final agreement on the 
Emission Trading Directive, the Commission issued a proposal to amend this 
Directive with respect to the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms, the so-called 
“Linking Directive” (European Commission 2003). On the same day, also a 
Commission staff working paper on the extended impact assessment on this 
proposal was published
4. 
In a next step, the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council that 
took place on 16 and 17 October 2003 (Council of the European Union 2003) 
called for an early approval of the proposal to promote the diffusion of clean 
technologies as well as to safeguard competitiveness of the European industry. 
However, at the Environment Council meeting of 27 October 2003 in Luxemburg, 
ministers of the environment of the EU did not find an agreement on the proposal 
and decision was postponed. The main reason for the delay was that some of the 
Member States pushed for the possibility to convert JI/CDM credits into European 
allowances already in the first trading scheme and not only by 1 January 2008 as 
indicated in the proposal. 
The European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Policy adopted on 16 March 2004 its report on the proposed directive, 
suggesting several amendments to the original proposal. In particular, following a 
report by the European Parliament rapporteur De Roo (European Parliament 
2004), the condition of the Kyoto Protocol entering into force to allow the linking 
was dropped. After a compromise deal, the Council agreed on the text of the 
Linking Directive, which was then formally adopted by the Parliament on 20 April 
2004 at its first reading in Strasbourg.  
                                                           
4 “Extended Impact Assessment on the Commission proposal for a Directive amending the 
Directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms SEC(2003)785, Brussels, 23 
July 2003”, see: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/pdf/extendedasses785-3.pdf   
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On September 15th, the EU foreign ministers formally adopted the Linking 
Directive, connecting the EU ETS to the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms in 
that it gives firms direct access to credits from project mechanisms as a means of 
meeting their emission caps. The final text allows firms to have direct access to 
CDM credits from 2005 and to JI credits from 2008, independently from the entry 
into force of the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, credits from nuclear projects and 
from sinks are excluded in the first phase, while hydroelectricity projects must be 
implemented following international rules. Finally, no formal limitation to the 
quantity of credits to be included in the European emissions trading scheme is 
imposed, but Member States must consider the issue of supplementarity by the 
end of 2007 and specify a limit up to which individual installations will be able to 
use these credits to comply with the emissions trading scheme. 
On 13 November 2004, the Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council has been published in the EU official journal, and the 
European Commission has thus met its objective to enable its entry into force 
before the 1 January, start date for trading in the EU trading scheme. 
3.3.  Transposition and implementation 
Member States needed to transpose the Emission Trading Directive in national 
law by 31 December 2003. However, the tight deadlines and short time period to 
get used to the new instrument and to prepare the first national allocation plans 
made it difficult for Member States to meet this deadline. As a consequence, the 
Commission sent first written warnings to all EU15 Member States at the 
beginning of 2004. In July 2004, the Commission issued final warnings to the EU-
15, except Austria, France, Germany and Sweden, who had communicated 
legislation that was being examined by the Commission. In January 2005, the 
Commission continued legal action against four Member States (Greece, Italy, 
Belgium, and Finland) for not having fully transposed the Directive into national 
law. 
One of the key requirements of the EU ETS regarded the development of 
National Allocation Plans for the first trading period (2005-07), which had to be 
elaborated by the Member States and notified to the Commission by 31 March 
2004. The NAPs define the total number of allowances to be created for the 
period and the distribution of these allowances to individual installations. Only 
Germany, Austria, Ireland, Finland and Denmark complied with the mentioned 
deadline, while the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden and UK submitted the  
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document with a slight delay. From the new Member States, only Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia met their extended deadline (31 May 
2004). All the remaining Member States did not submit the final plans in time. In 
July 2004, the Commission decided to launch infringement procedures against 
Italy and Greece for being late in submitting their NAPs. In January 2005, Greece 
finally submitted as the last missing Member State its allocation plan. In June 
2005, the Commission accepted this last NAP, completing thereby its 
assessment of allocation plans for the first trading phase. 
Similar delays in transposition were also observed in the final stage of the 
allocation cycle, the issuance of allowances into an electronic registry account at 
national level. Indeed, as the EUAs (Emission Unit Allowances) only exist as 
electronic units, the development of a secure system that tracks the issuing, 
holdings, transfer and surrendering of allowances is crucial for the functioning of 
the scheme. Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 of 21 December 2004 
for a standardised and secured system of registries (European Commission 
2004) outlines the design of a common backbone system, the Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL), and of individual registries in each 
European member state linked together by the CITL. In order to link up to the 
registries system, each Member State was responsible for establishing a national 
registry that is capable of conducting the functional and technical specifications 
required by this regulation by 31 December 2004. However, only a few countries 
met this deadline, impeding the work of major parts of the market as companies 
in countries without registries were deprived of spot trading. Due to delays in 
obtaining and assessing NAPs, the Commission decided only in April 2006 to 
initiate infringement procedures for failure to set up national registries, sending 
first warning letters to Cyprus, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta and Poland. After a 
gradual process, the last registry, the Polish one, went online in the beginning of 
July 2006. 
The Linking Directive faced similar difficulties and delays in implementation, 
which was to be transposed by Member States into national legislation by 13 
November 2005. Due to the other tight deadlines and numerous requirements to 
make the EU ETS start in 2005, the transposition of the Linking Directive into 
national law proceeded quite slowly. However, delay here was not as 
immediately important since few CERs were expected to be available before mid-
2007.   
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4. TOOLS AND INSTRUMENTS  
The EU ETS is based on the belief that market-based instruments can play a 
major role in environmental policy. While command and control instruments 
operate by imposing mandatory obligations on the behaviour of firms and 
individuals, transferable permits create markets for the pollution externality. 
Marketable permits are based on the principle of economic incentives and 
freedom of choice in the context of the workings of the market. By defining 
property rights for environmental resources and making them tradable, a market-
clearing price emerges as a market for these permits develops, indicating the 
opportunity cost of emissions. The “cap-and-trade” marketable emission trading 
scheme starts from the setting of the “cap”, or the total quantity of emissions 
allowed. The system is constantly monitored and sufficient penalties are applied 
to sources which emit in excess. It is the exchange process that generates the 
attractive qualities of the system. In effect, polluters with low costs of abatement 
will find it relatively easy to abate pollution rather than buy more permits while 
polluters with higher costs of abatement will acquire permits rather than abating 
emissions. Thus both parties benefit from the trade and cost minimization 
behavior will result into the equalization of marginal abatement costs, enabling 
thus actors to achieve environmental goals at lowest possible costs compared to 
other policy instruments. 
This type of instruments actually has entered the European policy scene quite 
late, as Europe was traditionally rather advocating command-and-control 
instruments. The main force behind emissions trading in the context of 
environmental policy has traditionally been the US, where amongst others 
important experiences had been made in the context of a SO2 trading system. 
Europe indeed accepted the US request to allow for emissions trading in the 
Kyoto Protocol only at the final negotiations to avoid a breakdown of the entire 
climate policy process. Yet, after the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, 
ironically this instrument became the primary tool for Europe’s compliance with its 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol
5.  
While the EU ETS is clearly motivated by the Kyoto Protocol, and probably would 
not have been adopted otherwise, it is also curiously independent of the Kyoto 
Protocol. This is mainly shown by the fact that the ETS is embedded in EU law 
                                                           
5 For a deeper analysis of the origins (as well as of the first results) of the EU ETS see Ellerman 
and Buchner (2007).   
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and its implementation does not depend on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Finally, as illustrated by the current “post-2012” discussion, the EU ETS is 
expected to continue beyond 2012 regardless of the fate of the Kyoto Protocol.  
The instrument of emissions trading has gained momentum in Europe based on 
the US precedents. Indeed, there were also some early European experiences 
with CO2 emissions trading. The three most important ones were the UK 
Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS), the Danish CO2 trading program, and the 
Dutch procurement tenders for JI and CDM credits, ERUPT and CERUPT 
respectively. All of these are different in important ways from the EU ETS, but 
they contributed to making emissions trading a less foreign innovation.
6 In 
addition, both Sweden and Norway established high-level commissions to 
examine the feasibility of emissions trading and those commissions 
recommended emissions trading as the primary means of meeting their targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol.  
While the instrument of emission trading has cautiously become more popular 
over the last years, at the same time the traditionally used instruments have 
faced increasingly difficulties on an EU-wide scale. For instance, efforts to get a 
carbon tax adopted had failed because, as a fiscal matter, it required unanimity in 
the Council of Ministers. Such an agreement was impossible to obtain; Member 
States from North to South within the EU had several difficulties with the tax, 
mainly rising from intense industrial lobbying. 
The EU ETS seems to apply different tools for distinct levels of governance. At 
the EU level, the instruments used for policy formulation and for the 
implementation phase mainly refer to the so-called “old” mode of governance, 
and are based on detailed legislation, use of sanctions and setting of legally 
binding objectives. However at the Member States level the system offers more 
flexibility, mainly arising from the creation of a market that opens the possibility of 
voluntary agreement and exchanges among firms and countries. 
                                                           
6 The UK ETS, which started in 2001, is a mixed absolute cap and baseline-and-credit system 
intended to provide experience for firms willing to accept a cap in return for an incentive payment 
and introduce flexibility into Climate Change Agreements that had been negotiated between 
industry and the government. The Danish CO2 trading system, which started in 2002, was limited 
to the electric utility sector and it included a safety valve feature at a relatively low level 
(approximately US$7/tonne CO2). The Dutch ERUPT/CERUPT programs were solicitations for JI 
and CDM credits that could be used as Kyoto compliant offsets with a relatively low ceiling price.  
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5. ACTORS AND NEGOTIATION PROCESSES 
The actors involved in the EU Emission Trading scheme show distinctive roles at 
different levels of governance. 
At the international level, the system benefited from the extraordinary strong role 
of the EU Commission, which assured the unexpected rapidity and the 
effectiveness of the whole process. The EU ETS is basically a mandatory 
system, with binding rules, central monitoring and administrative experts.  
However, despite the hierarchical character of the system, national control over 
cap setting gave it fundamental decentralised character compared, for example, 
to the US SO2 and NOX trading system. 
Moreover, the Commission realised the importance of stakeholder’s consultation 
and analyses and carried out several consultative processes. Non-state actors, 
such as stakeholders, firms, industry associations, NGOs, market intermediates 
etc have been actively involved in the scheme. Yet, the rapidity of the whole 
process did not leave enough space for these important tools and the 
Commission is now planning to intensify consultation processes in the future
7. 
Member States play a crucial role in the EU Emission Trading scheme. The total 
cap of emissions is given by the sum of all the caps set at the national level. Each 
country is responsible for the transposition and the implementation of the EU ETS 
Directive, and for the definition of the National Allocation Plans and for the 
creation of a national registry. 
Within the Member States, companies of the six covered industry sectors were 
closely involved in the set-up of the EU ETS, particularly in the context of the 
allocation process. In fact, as emphasised in Buchner et al. (2007), the allocation 
process can best be described as an extended dialogue between the government 
and industry in each country. The reason for this involvement of industry in the 
process is two-fold: first, as a consequence of the scarce data situation at 
installation level, the companies were needed in order to provide more detailed 
information on their emissions data. Second, the Emissions Trading Directive 
mandated that at least 95% of the allowances in Member States be allocated for 
free to the covered installations, creating thus a significant value of these 
endowments. These two factors together created an intense iterative process 
between the relevant parts of the Member State governments and the affected 
industry whereby data was collected, cross-checked, and refined at the same  
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time that distribution proposals were made, evaluated against the data, and 
modified until a final NAP emerged. This interactive process was a key factor in 
successfully completing the NAP process. 
At the same time, each country had for obvious reasons to face difficult 
negotiation processes with companies and industry associations, which often 
claimed that the NAPs could place them in competitive disadvantage. The 
government had thus a role of a final arbiter, managing a process by which 
conflicting claims could be resolved. The industry clearly engaged in much 
lobbying, but the fixed total forced all players into a zero-sum game where a 
defensive concern about what competitors would receive became as important as 
offensive attempts to gain more for themselves (Cf. Buchner et al. 2007). 
However it should be noticed that, while EU industries were almost unanimously 
critical of the EU carbon or energy tax initiatives, several of them welcomed the 
idea of emission trading as a central, cost-effective, instrument of climate policy. 
British Petroleum (BP) started an internal pilot system in September 1998 and 
Shell followed suit in 2000. Hence, from 1998, industry started to gain an 
important experience with the ET instrument.  
An intense debate among the different actors was brought on both at the national 
and at the EU levels. For example, due to the complexity and the novelty of the 
system, many companies within the European Union resulted unprepared for 
trading and also showed high scepticism with regard to a timely start and well-
functioning of the scheme. Conflicting pressures emerged thus between domestic 
industries and countries’ governments, but the main disputes arose during the 
process of approval of the NAPs by the European Commission.  
Indeed, the process of allocating the emission allowances in Europe has 
attracted world-wide attention given the importance of the allocation process for 
the overall efficiency of any potential emission trading scheme. EU Member 
States needed to decide on the amount of GHG emissions allowances (EUAs) to 
allocate for the period of 2005 to 2007 to large fixed sources of CO2 - the national 
allocation plans (NAPs) - by March 2004, and allocation plans for the second 
phase from 2008 to 2012 are currently under assessment. For obvious reasons, 
the allocation process has proved to be very difficult. Each country needed to 
consider a number of criteria simultaneously, mainly determining what proportion 
of the reduction will come from the sectors under the EU ETS and what from 
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other sectors (especially transport, buildings and agriculture) and from other 
mitigation opportunities including the non-CO2 GHGs sequestration and Kyoto 
projects allowances. The lack of data at the level of the installation was the 
biggest problem confronted in the allocation process by nearly all Member States, 
and it came as surprise to most people since all countries had developed 
reasonably good inventories of CO2 emissions data. The reason for the 
constrained data availability was that the inventory data were developed from 
statistics of aggregate energy use and they did not extend to the level of the 
installation, which was the mandated recipient of the allowance allocations by the 
EU Directive. Given the tight time constraints for submitting NAPs, obtaining 
installation-level data became the first major hurdle that had to be cleared and 
the final allocation choices were strongly influenced by considerations of what 
data could be obtained within the available time. In addition, for both existing and 
new market participants, the allocation process – both related to the 
determination of national and sector totals – relied on projections of future energy 
use and economic activity. As a matter of fact, the use of predictions is very likely 
to involve some error and to be subject to subtle gaming; but they were 
unavoidable and helped narrowing the debate and constraining the often 
expansive claims based on bottom-up estimates. A further difficulty faced by 
Member States was the treatment of small installations, triggered by the very low 
level of heat input (20 MW thermal) that the Directive had established as the 
threshold for inclusion in the ETS. As noted frequently, the inclusion of small 
installations was not worth it because it required more time and effort than would 
appear to be justified by their emissions or abatement potential.
8 
The NAP process throughout the EU-25 Member States has been extremely 
complex and contentious, and intense debates caused delays in the submissions 
and consequently decisions on the NAPs. Still, given the highly different 
circumstances of the EU Member States and their equally varying commitments 
to adopting meaningful measures to restrict CO2 emissions, the fact that the EU 
ETS was launched on time and that agreements on the overall allocation could 
be found is a major achievement. The first phase from 2005 to 2007 is explicitly 
referred to as a pilot phase, and many decisions have been taken to ensure a 
timely start of the scheme and to make experiences for the subsequent periods.  
                                                           
8 A detailed discussion and analysis of the lessons and general principles to be learnt from the first 
allocation phase in the EU ETS can be found in Buchner et al. (2007).  
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In particular, the limited data availability posed a challenge for the allowance 
allocation. A much-noted by-product of the need to acquire installation-level data 
for allowance allocation was the resulting significant improvement in the quality of 
the data on emissions and energy use. Still, until aggregate emission data was 
released after the first year of the scheme, no one had a really good idea of what 
aggregate emissions of the covered sectors are, and for this reason – as well as 
for reasons of creating acceptance across the Member States – the market was 
characterised by a higher than anticipated supply in the first years, affecting the 
stringency and consequently carbon price of the scheme.
9  
Notwithstanding all the difficulties, the EU Commission maintained its strong 
central role throughout the whole process, imposing its rules for allocation and 
penalizing with warning and legal actions non-complying countries, in order to 
avoid a watering-down of the EU ETS principles. Signals for the second phase 
allocations indicate that the Commission aims at a more stringent allocation for 
the second phase, ensuring thus a viable market. In conclusion, the role of the 
centre was critical in arriving at the final outcome.
10 Indeed, it is hard to imagine 
how twenty-five nations could have succeeded in such a multi-national enterprise 
without the central coordinating role played by the European Commission. 
 
6. DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE IN THE EU ETS 
The governance perspective characterising the EU ETS can be analysed as a 
dynamic process which moves from an initial shaping of the system with the 
characteristic features of the Open Methods of Coordination (OMC) (see, for 
instance, Eberlein, Newman 2006), to a binding and structured approach, which 
leaves nonetheless flexibility at the state level. 
                                                           
9 While over-allocation cannot be dismissed as a possibility, a long position is not per se evidence 
of over-allocation, as installations could also have abated in order to sell allowances or to bank 
them for use in later years. For a preliminary analysis of this issue based on the 2005 data see 
Ellerman and Buchner (2006). 
10 The Commission acted as agent for the whole in implementing a commonly agreed upon policy, 
and was as educator and facilitator of the decisions that Member States had to take. In addition, it 
provided technical competence and political capability generally displayed in supporting the 
scheme. Of course, there were also problems in the Commission’s implementation of the 
Directive. Specifically, there was widespread criticism of the lack of sufficient guidance on what 
constituted an installation. The Commission’s assessment process has also been criticised as being 
too ‘high level’, not transparent enough and not involving enough technical expertise in the sense 
that decisions on the evaluation of the allocation plans have not always made by those who were 
familiar with the technical details of the different countries. For a discussion of the various aspects 
of the Commission’s role see Buchner et al. (2007).  
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The rationale behind the creation of an emission trading scheme, and the 
experiences carried out at the international level, in particular the US experience 
of sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) emission trading, showed a 
dynamic nature, decentralised in its functioning and based on experience sharing 
and comparison of best practice, rather than on a single legislative framework. 
Throughout most of the 1990s, the EU had been the leading sceptic in global 
climate diplomacy to emissions trading, favouring instead coordinated policies 
and measures. The EU ETS developed in contrast to command-and-control 
approaches, and even to the taxation instrument, and its potential for reconciling 
EU economic and environmental goals encouraged its definition. The system was 
therefore designed as a flexible mechanism that should help Member States to 
progress jointly towards the Kyoto target, through horizontal learning processes. 
A first “warm-up” phase of the EU ETS (2005 to 2007) was intended to be a pilot 
phase allowing for ‘learning by doing’. It was commonly accepted that a certain 
amount of adaptation would be necessary. 
Success of the EU ETS depends, inter alia, on simplicity. While all stakeholders 
agree in principle to strive towards a simple and consistent scheme, there was 
pressure on governments to grant exemptions and special treatment in national 
allocations, which tends to increase complexity. An overly complex EU ETS will 
jeopardise attainment of both environmental and economic objectives, which, 
namely, are to reach the necessary reductions at the least cost. 
However, as an international-wide trading scheme across a range of industries, 
the EU ETS required the construction of a novel regulatory system. This complex 
process generated intense debate over near- and long-term economic and 
political consequences. 
The discussion began at the institutional level, right after the issue of the 2000 ET 
Green paper, which started to enrich the discourse around the EU ETS. The 
Green Paper outlined several options with regard to the binding nature of the 
system, including a more flexible “opt-in” clause for the genuinely interested 
Member States and “opt-out” clauses for certain sectors. It should be noted that, 
although a mandatory character was envisaged for the system, national control 
over cap setting gave it a fundamental flexible and decentralised character. 
Synergies with the 1996 Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) 
Directive were explored, as was compatibility with the process of liberalizing 
energy markets. Still, several issues related to the proposal were unclear and the  
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resistance from different parts of the European Commission as well as other 
European Institutions was strong. As a consequence, the final text of the 
Emission Trading Directive evolved alongside numerous discussion and 
additional information including, among others, amendments on the allocation 
methods, on penalties and transparency proposed by the European Parliament 
and by the Council. 
Many debates arose also at the Member States level. Several countries, among 
them such heavy-weights as Germany and the UK, were critical of aspects of the 
Commission’s design. For instance, when the Environment Ministers discussed 
the trading system further in December 2001, the UK opposed it being mandatory 
from the outset, and received support from Germany, among others, who was 
worried that compulsory participation would clash with its national energy 
efficiency agreements with industry.  
Business circles across Europe focussed their criticism on the EU "going it alone" 
on climate change and imposing costly unilateral measures which do not apply to 
the EU's major competitors. They argued the system would  ultimately lead to 
delocalisation and job losses with no overall improvement for the environment as 
the bulk of the world's CO2 was emitted elsewhere (US, China), and that a global 
problem such as climate change could not be resolved at EU level but only on a 
global scale. 
Large  power companies were pushing for a full use of the Kyoto flexible 
mechanisms in the EU-ETS. They complained that the current "bureaucratic 
procedures and restrictive interpretations" imposed too many restrictions on their 
full-scale use. At the same time, the scheme was accused to place the electricity 
sector under pressure to make massive investments in order to switch to cleaner 
production methods (e.g.: from coal to gas-fired power stations), leading to higher 
electricity prices. Power-intensive industries (e.g.: cement, iron and steel and 
others) warned that, in the absence of competition in the European electricity 
market, power companies would be passing on extra costs to industrial 
consumers. The coalition raised the prospect of an "enormous risk of de-
industrialisation" in Europe as a consequence. Moreover, planning and 
subsequent national reporting requirements imposed on business were often 
criticised as too burdensome.  
Despite these complains about restricted possibilities to adopt the flexible 
mechanisms electricity suppliers are considered as the major winners of the  
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introduction of emissions trading. The economist Axel Ockenfels explains in an 
interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
11 that electricity suppliers can, 
because of the product attributes of electricity, fully include the opportunity costs 
of using (instead of selling) emissions rights into the calculation of electricity 
prices. These costs are thus fully conferred to the consumers. It does not matter 
here that emissions rights are at first distributed for free, because the loss of 
profit resulting from the use of the rights is independent from the question how 
these rights were acquired 
Environmental groups  initially hailed the EU for putting in place its trading 
scheme and taking global leadership to tackle climate change. But they were 
disappointed when the 2005 emissions data showed that member states were left 
with large amounts of unused credits. In addition, most environmental NGOs 
disapproved the use of CM/JIs, saying they undermined the EU's pledge to cut 
emissions at home. 
The tension was building up and the main risk was to end up in additional and 
prolonged negotiations. The Commission maintained its strong role throughout 
the whole decision-making process, to speed up the negotiations and avoid the 
watering down of the basic ET principles. However it allowed the opening of a 
first test phase, which let come out many weaknesses and pitfalls of the system. 
Learning from this experience, a process of review of the scheme for the second 
round of allocation was carried out. 
In a Communication
12 to the EU Council and Parliament, published in November 
2006, the Commission analyses how the ETS has worked to date and identifies 
the need of a review process, with a view of adapting some features of the 
system for the trading period starting in 2013. The report strongly recommends a 
broader involvement of stakeholders with a high quality input in the review 
process. If at the EU level stakeholders could not play a sufficiently 
representative role in the ETS policy definition phase, mainly because of the 
rapidity of the process, now the Commission invites interested parties to 
communicate further views and share practical experience gained in the 
implementation of the system. 
Considering the difficulties in the elaboration and implementation of the NAPs, 
the Commission regards for further harmonisation of the cap-setting and 
allocation process. The review will explore the option of a single EU-wide cap and 
                                                           
11 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 April 2006, No. 92, p. 12  
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that of separate national caps after 2012 determined by each Member State, and 
will consider specific issues related to auctioning and benchmarking. 
At the same time, the Commission underlines the importance of robust 
compliance and enforcement procedures for the good functioning of the scheme. 
It will be considered whether the monitoring and reporting guidelines should be 
laid down in a Regulation in order to aid harmonised application of the legislation. 
Some of the options identified in the review would result in a considerable 
number of additional tasks to be undertaken at the community level to implement 
the EU ETS after 2012. The institutional arrangements at both Community and 
Member State level are therefore being adapted to new needs arising out of the 
review. The result is a more mature scheme, supported by a structured and 
binding system of rules, targets, monitoring and sanctions, but which maintains 
its flexible character at the Member States level. 
7. MODES OF GOVERNANCE  
The peculiar characteristics of the EU ETS make it difficult to relate it to a specific 
mode of governance. The system shows many aspects belonging to the “old” 
mode of governance, such as the top-down decision-making process, based on 
legislation and on state-centric perspective, although not confined to the national 
level. The implementation of the scheme is subject to processes of monitoring 
and control, and to the use of sanctions and legal actions. Monitoring and 
reporting of an installation’s emissions are carried out based on binding EU-wide 
guidelines, and all self-reported emissions must be verified by an independent 
third party.  
At the same time, the participation of non-state actors played an essential role in 
policy definition (e.g. during the elaboration of the EU ETS Directive, or the 
formulation of the NAPs), through processes of bargaining. 
Several modes of governance analysed in the literature might have some 
elements partially matching with the EU ETS characteristics, such as “Framework 
regulation” (Treib et al. 2005) and “Incorporated transgovernmentalism” (Eberlein, 
Newmann 2006) modes. 
However, the best correspondence between our findings and the modes of 
governance seems to be the “Competition” mode, identified by Knill (2005), which 
unifies both hierarchical, legislative based and bottom-up, participatory and 
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flexible modes of governance
13. In the EU ETS in fact, state-actors are 
responsible for policy formulation, but are likely to be under strong pressure from 
commercial non-state actors, who are directly affected by the legislation and will 
be the main actors of the implementation phase. 
The EU ETS represents a clear example of Multi-Level Governance, where 
different modes of governance are applied at different levels. At the EU level the 
dominant mode of governance seems to be characterised by regulation and 
administrative decision-making, under the European Commission leadership. 
Then, at the national level, the interaction with non-state actors plays a crucial 
role, assigning more importance to individual decisions and to the use of market 
instruments during the EU ETS implementation phase. In this way the system 
results strong and binding, but at the same time it should be more compatible 
with the different individual countries characteristics and needs. 
The different modes of governance interact among them and affect each other. 
Considering the evolution of the system and the proposals made by the 
Commission for a review of the ETS, we could identify a kind of “behavioural 
interaction”.  
8. CONCLUSIONS  
The timeline of the two directives relevant for the EU ETS highlights the 
enormous achievement of European climate policy in implementing an efficient 
method of cross-sectoral integration. Even though the time span between the 
proposal for the emissions trading scheme and its actual implementation was 
short, the process that led to the current situation has posed several significant 
challenges and overcome several barriers. From the initial milestone, the Green 
Paper that extensively discussed and proposed emissions trading as an idea for 
Europe, to the actual fundamental role in the European Climate Change 
Programme (ECCP), the Emission Trading Directive has faced resistance and 
caused tough debates, involving at the same time state and non-state actors. 
Given the tight deadlines faced during this difficult negotiation process, the 
achievement that the EU Emission Trading Scheme now has become the 
cornerstone of European climate policy is even more outstanding. Within less 
                                                           
13 The literature sometimes distinguishes between “new” and “old” modes of governance. The 
former is traditionally associated with top-down, legislative processes and administrative decision 
making, while the latter with bargaining, deliberation, and learning in networks (e.g. Börzel, 
2006). The terminology is however misleading, as bottom-up, participatory governance is not 
necessarily more recent than hierarchical, legislative governance.   
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than five years, the EU ETS has evolved from an innovative idea to an 
indispensable instrument for Europe’s approach to cope with climate change. 
Overall, the staged nature of implementation – in the sense that only few Member 
States were formally ready when the EU ETS started in January 2005 – 
highlighted that Member State governments were working under tight deadlines 
and high pressure to set up institutions and pass laws and regulations in 
preparation for a timely start of the scheme. Given all these additional difficulties 
and barriers, and particularly the regulatory delays in Member State governments 
surrounding some NAPs as well as the establishment of national registries, the 
timely start of the EU-wide emissions trading scheme is even more astonishing.  
The multi-level nature of EU ETS governance is characteristic of the EU policy, 
where central leadership co-exists with decentralised transposition of the 
legislation and implementation. The EU ETS represents a significant experience 
of integration of distinct modes of governance, where the old top-down approach 
to environmental issues is combined with a participatory bottom-up process. 
Still, the positive results of the scheme, in terms of timing (rapidity of the process) 
and of width (number of countries and actors involved) are mainly referable to the 
strong role of leadership played by the EU Commission throughout the whole 
process of policy definition and system implementation. The adoption of a 
detailed legislative framework with binding targets, and the creation of a system 
of monitoring and sanctions, were indispensable to establish a market in 
greenhouse gas emissions allowances and ensure its proper functioning and 
supervision. In this respect, what are often referred to in the literature as “old 
modes of governance” (Börzel, 2006) – that is, governance systems based on 
legislative processes, and administrative decision making – have proven not only 
effective, but also necessary to ensure that new, more participatory, modes of 
governance could successfully be implemented. Without the strong leadership 
and commitment of the Commission, bargaining, deliberative decision making 
and consensus building around the text and details of the EU ETS would never 
have been possible. 
The EU ETS can thus be assessed positively with respect to the process of EPI 
that it has initiated, encouraging a wide variety of actors – both private and public, 
at the EU level, national, and regional – to consider climate change in their 
planning and actions. In spite of the success and spread of the system, however, 
it is too early to assess its effectiveness in terms of significantly reducing GHGs  
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emissions. The debate on the real effectiveness of the first “pilot” phase of the EU 
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